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Abstract
Decrypting and inspecting encrypted malicious communications may assist crime detection and prevention. Access to client or
server memory enables the discovery of artefacts required for decrypting secure communications. This paper develops the MemDe-
crypt framework to investigate they discovery of encrypted artefacts in memory and applies the methodology to decrypting the
secure communications of virtual machines. For Secure Shell, used for secure remote server management, file transfer, and tun-
nelling inter alia, MemDecrypt experiments rapidly yield AES-encrypted details for a live secure file transfer including remote user
credentials, transmitted file name and file contents. Thus, MemDecrypt discovers cryptographic artefacts and quickly decrypts live
SSH malicious communications including detection and interception of data exfiltration of confidential data.
Keywords: network traffic; decryption; memory analysis; IoT; Android; VMI; Secure Shell; SSH; AES; Secure File Transfer; data
exfiltration; insider attacks;
1. Introduction1
Decrypting malicious communications offers opportunities2
to discover useful information. This could include botnet com-3
mand and control traffic identifying compromised machines,4
confidential information that has been extracted and sent or up-5
loaded to an external location, ransomware keys, or details of6
criminal activity [1]. This paper focuses on decrypting Secure7
Shell (SSH) traffic, a potential medium for data exfiltration [2].8
Realistically useful decryption methods require a knowledge of9
both the algorithm and the cryptographic artefacts used. En-10
cryption techniques based only on algorithmic secrecy may be11
unreliable, as mechanisms such as reverse-engineering enable12
the algorithm’s functionality to be discovered and furthermore,13
without extensive independent verification, the robustness of an14
encryption algorithm may be weak [3]. As a result, publicly15
known encryption algorithms are commonly used, and key se-16
crecy thus becomes paramount. Generating sufficiently long17
random blocks as keys makes decryption unlikely using brute18
force methods.19
To decrypt, a framework must discover keys and other cryp-20
tographic artefacts. When software applications perform en-21
cryption and decryption, the artefacts reside in program mem-22
ory at that moment, whether on the program stack, in the heap,23
or in shared memory. As memory access is important to foren-24
sic investigations [4] software tools and libraries already exist25
to support such capability for technologies such as desktops,26
servers, the Internet of Things (IoT), Android smartphones,27
and virtualized environments. Mechanisms to discover cryp-28
tographic artefacts in memory in a manner that allows the tar-29
get device to continue to operate normally during an investi-30
gation while remaining undetectable is of particular interest.31
This paper presents the MemDecrypt framework that stealthily32
decrypts secure communications traffic. Although earlier re-33
searchers have discovered encryption keys in device memory,34
other cryptographic artefacts, commonly required to decrypt35
secure traffic, are not considered. MemDecrypt implements a36
novel approach to decrypting SSH traffic by analyzing target37
memory extracts to identify these candidate cryptographic arte-38
facts (initialization vectors) that, in turn, enable rapid location39
of candidate keys and the deciphering of payloads in live ses-40
sions with high probability. This enables malicious SSH ac-41
tivity in live secure communications sessions to be addressed.42
The techniques proposed are applicable to a range of device43
platforms, though the MemDecrypt framework is particularly44
focused on decrypting communications from within virtual ma-45
chines.46
Although plaintext could be obtained by adding an audit47
function to the binary, this is arguably a different application48
and has some similarity with a key logger, which may only be49
acceptable in specific environments. Also, unless all plaintext is50
captured rather than client input, file contents are not captured.51
Plaintext could possibly be obtained by extracting on buffer52
memory writes. However, researchers have found that monitor-53
ing virtual machine read/write buffers is inefficient. As mem-54
ory extraction is invasive minimizing the number of extracts is55
preferable so with buffer memory write triggers, the larger the56
exfiltrated file, the more extracts. To discover the plaintext of57
a full session, buffer breaks would need to be in place before58
the session. In MemDecrypt, memory can be extracted at any59
stage after the handshake completes to decrypt a captured net-60
work session. Buffer memory write triggers may be effective61
with interactive sessions as with exfiltrated data, missing an ex-62
tract makes decryption problematic. Furthermore, exfiltrating63
non-ASCII data may be more challenging without certainty of64
buffer memory locations.65
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. To provide66
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framework context, the background to secure communications67
is provided in Section II. Earlier research in discovering crypto-68
graphic artefacts is reviewed in Section III. Section IV presents69
the MemDecrypt design and Section V the implementation de-70
tails. Test results are evaluated and discussed in Section VI and71
conclusions drawn in Section VII.72
2. Related Work73
This section provides a summary of symmetric encryption in-74
cluding block and stream algorithms commonly used in secure75
communications protocols. Approaches for accessing memory76
to support cryptographic artefact discovery are also discussed.77
Although there is no published research into finding crypto-78
graphic artefacts in Android smartphone and IOT device mem-79
ory, desktop and server memory has been studied. Entropy80
measures have frequently been used as a filtering mechanism to81
discover keys. This approach assisted in searches for AES key82
schedules after cold-boot attacks [5] as well in finding Skipjack83
and Twofish algorithm artefacts [6]. These studies focus on en-84
cryption key discovery in dormant devices and therefore do not85
decrypt the secure network sessions of live virtual machines.86
Although malware analysis and detection has been a research87
focus for monitoring from outside the virtual machine, it has88
also been applied to analyze secure communications. For ex-89
ample, SSH session details were obtained from an SSH hon-90
eypot server customized to extract data when the specific sys-91
tem calls executed [7]. In TLSkex [8], AES-CBC cryptographic92
keys were discovered in Linux client virtual machine memory93
when Change Cipher Spec messages were detected in TLS net-94
work sessions by searching for bit strings where the counts of95
0’s and 1’s suggested randomness. TLSkex investigates TLS96
traffic only so, for example, the uploading of confidential data97
using SSH is not considered. Furthermore, TLSkex analysis is98
restricted to Linux virtual machine so Windows virtual machine99
activity is excluded. The MemDecrypt framework decrypts en-100
tire sessions for both SSH and TLS protocols where different101
encryption algorithms have been applied for Windows clients102
and Linux servers using a standard entropy measure. Moreover,103
MemDecrypt memory extractions are independent of message104
type and discovery of candidate initialization vectors drives the105
decryption process.106
Encryption keys can be discovered by intercepting encryp-107
tion function calls to extract parameters. For example, the108
Linux ptrace command can attach to the encrypting process109
enabling identification of keys and other artefacts [9]. This110
approach may have been used to discover SSH plaintext, ci-111
phertext, and keys, although implementation details are unclear112
[10]. These approaches are Linux-specific and are easily de-113
tectable by virtual machine software. Consequently, they may114
not be effective against malicious insiders, especially when the115
target device runs Windows. MemDecrypt decrypts SSH net-116
work sessions in a stealthy manner by triggering memory ex-117
tracts only when an unusual event is detected.118
2.1. Encryption algorithms119
Encryption algorithms for secure communications are asym-120
metric or symmetric. For encryption and decryption, asym-121
metric algorithms use different keys whereas symmetric algo-122
rithms use the same keys. Asymmetric algorithms attain se-123
curity through computational complexity, which takes proces-124
sor time, making them considerably less CPU efficient than125
symmetric algorithms [11]. Consequently, asymmetric algo-126
rithms are frequently only used for agreement on symmetric127
keys, which are then used to encrypt the channel. Symmet-128
ric encryption algorithms are either stream algorithms, where129
plaintext is encrypted with either bit-by-bit or block algorithms130
(where blocks of a specific size are encrypted). Although the131
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block algorithm may be132
the gold standard, vulnerability and performance concerns have133
led to the adoption of ChaCha20 stream algorithm with Poly-134
1305 authentication [12] in secure protocols such as OpenSSH135
and OpenSSL, as well as being used for Google Chrome related136
communications on Android smartphones [13].137
Block and stream algorithms commonly require initialization138
vectors (IVs) for secure communications. For AES, IVs incor-139
porated in the encryption process provide defenses against re-140
play attacks [14]. For example, in AES counter mode (AES-141
CTR), an IV is encrypted and XORed with the plaintext to142
produce ciphertext. AES-CTR is the quickest AES mode, and143
is recommended by security experts [3] [15]. For ChaCha20,144
the key, IV, and a counter are parameters to keystream creation145
[12]. The keystream is XORed with the plaintext to produce ci-146
phertext. Both AES-CTR and ChaCha20 are approved for SSH147
[16] and TLS protocols. Consequently, encryption keys and148
IVs must be discovered to decrypt AES-CTR and ChaCha20149
encrypted SSH and TLS channels.150
This paper focuses on SSH communications. For SSH in151
AES-CTR mode, the IV increments by 1 for each outgoing152
plaintext block [17] so that the difference between the IV for the153
first plaintext block in packets n+1 and n is the number of plain-154
text blocks in packet n. Although AES-CTR is the only rec-155
ommended SSH AES mode [16], AES-CBC is also used. For156
AES-CBC, each IV after the initial value is the ciphertext of the157
previous block [17]. Consequently, the IV for each encrypted158
AES-CBC block is known. ChaCha20 uses the IV to generate159
key streams. It performs 20 rounds of mathematical operations160
starting from a base structure consisting of a constant string of161
16 bytes, a generated 32-byte key, a 4-byte counter, and a 12-162
byte IV, where the counter is typically 0 or 1 for each 64-byte163
plaintext block [12].164
SSH enables secure management of remote servers across165
potentially insecure networks, offering functionality such as166
client-server file transfer. The protocol is specified in 4 key167
IETF RFCs: SSH Protocol Architecture (SSH-ARCH) [18],168
SSH Transport Layer Protocol (SSH-TRANS)[19], SSH Au-169
thentication Protocol (SSH-AUTH) [20], and the SSH Connec-170
tion Protocol (SSH-CONNECT) [21]. SSH-TRANS defines171
the initial connection, packet protocol, server authentication,172
and the basic encryption and integrity service [22]. Following173
the TCP handshake, the parties transmit supported SSH pro-174
tocol versions, and optionally application, which enables the175
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probable operating systems and library to be inferred. For in-176
stance, ’SSH-2.0-PuTTY_Release_0.70’ probably signifies that177
a Windows client is executing the PuTTY application [23].178
Exchanged ’Key Exchange Initialization; and ’Key Exchange’179
messages determine the session encryption and authentication180
algorithm and the material for the generation of the crypto-181
graphic artefacts. Client New Keys messages advises that all182
subsequent traffic in the session is encrypted. An example of183
the handshake process as well as the first encrypted packet is il-184
lustrated in Figure 1. SSH-AUTH defines authentication meth-185
ods such as public key, password, host based and none. After186
successful authentication, a file transfer requires the establish-187
ment of a secure channel to support the secure file transfer pro-188
tocol as defined by. Secure file transfer (SFTP) [24] is an SSH189
sub-system particularly worthy for investigation as significant190
potential exists for it to transfer confidential files out of a sys-191
tem.192
2.2. Memory Access193
Memory acquisition tools assist forensic analysis. So, for194
workstation and server technologies hardware and software ac-195
quisition methods exist [25]. Hardware acquisition typically196
involves connecting devices, such as PCMCIA cards or USB197
sticks, to a target [26] while software acquisition commonly in-198
volves executing extraction programs such as FTK Imager [27],199
Memoryze [28], or WinPmem [29] on the target [30]. These200
solutions may not always be practical in live network session201
decryption scenarios.202
Android smartphone volatile memory is accessible. As203
Androids run Linux, memory acquisition tools such as the204
Linux Memory Extractor (’LiME’) application [31] may suf-205
fice. However, LiME depends on compiled kernel modules206
for the target’s Linux version, support by the smartphone and207
kernel level execution. The quantity of Linux variations for208
Android smartphones as well as the installation and execution209
requirements may be challenging. AMExtractor [32] requires210
kernel execution privilege but no compilation is required and so211
is potentially less restrictive. TrustDump [33] may be appropri-212
ate but minimal testing has been carried out. Commercial tools213
such as Cellebrite also claim to extract memory from Android214
devices without target modification although usage is restricted215
[34].216
Internet of Things (IoT) devices also commonly run Linux217
[35]. However, device type and Linux variations pose po-218
tentially greater challenges than smartphones. Nevertheless,219
solutions that support live acquisition from Android smart-220
watches, as well as smartphones, have been proposed [36].221
IoT device memory may also be acquired by flashing mem-222
ory, running Linux dump commands, or accessing device cir-223
cuitry [37]. Furthermore, memory access with commercial224
tools, such as Cellebrite UFED Physical Analyzer, has also225
been demonstrated [38]. As IoT devices frequently commu-226
nicate with cloud-based servers, memory acquisition of virtual-227
ized machines may present an easier alternative [35]. Virtual-228
ization enables memory access. Virtualization technologies en-229
able virtual machines to share host computer resources thereby230
providing an opportunity to discover cryptographic artefacts in231
virtual machine memory from the physical host. This ensures232
investigations have reduced the impact on virtual machine op-233
erations. Furthermore, software programs executing on the vir-234
tual machine, such as malware, may not detect the investiga-235
tions. Examples of tools and libraries that support outsidethe-236
machine monitoring include LibVMI [39] together with PyVMI237
[40] and Volatility [41], and Rekall [42].238
3. MemDecrypt Design239
MemDecrypt consists of network and data collection, mem-240
ory analysis, and decrypt analysis components. Figure 2 illus-241
trates the MemDecrypt activity flow diagram. Each component242
is described in the following paragraphs.243
Network and Memory Extract. In MemDecrypt unusual244
events trigger memory extracts. This approach is less intru-245
sive than continuous memory monitoring where the monitor-246
ing and analysis activities of the host may impact target device247
performance. Furthermore, malware writers script programs248
to be aware of monitoring activity, which would probably be249
more obvious with continuous monitoring. The triggers ap-250
proach is also more precise than obtaining memory snapshots251
on a polled basis. Polling snapshots may miss malicious activ-252
ity if the polling interval is too large, especially when malware253
uses counter analysis techniques. The quantity and timing of254
memory extraction events depend on the target device, the se-255
cure protocol, and the encryption algorithm. Where memory is256
classifiable, the read/write memory of the encryption program257
is extracted for size minimization, with consequent reduced im-258
pact on target performance and faster subsequent analysis.259
Memory analysis. Candidate encryption keys and IVs are260
identified in the memory extracts. Although largely protocol261
specific, there are common features. In particular, candidate IV262
locations are discovered first with approaches that encompass263
an analysis of memory extracts, network packets or both net-264
work packets and memory extracts. As keys and IVs are crypto-265
graphic artefacts, the distance between their respective memory266
locations may be small If program memory extracts are taken267
when the same activity is being performed, such as the trans-268
mission of outgoing messages, memory blocks containing IVs269
change, while other blocks remain static.270
Key randomness makes it different from many other types of
memory regions. Key randomness means that the sequence of
bits cannot be easily predicted. The randomness of keys can be
evaluated using entropy, a measure of the amount of informa-
tion in a key. This paper uses Shannon’s entropy measure for
discrete variables [43] in preference to cryptographically use-
ful alternatives such as guessing entropy and min-entropy [44]
because smaller candidate key sets are produced:
H = −
n∑
i=1
p(i) log2 p(i) (1)
where p(i) is the normalized frequency of the ith byte in the271
message i.e. p(i) = f (i)/n. So, segments of high entropy user272
memory are more likely to contain the key. In contrast with273
IVs, keys do not generally change during a session. So, static,274
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Figure 1: SSH Handshake Example
Figure 2: MemDecrypt Activity Flow Diagram
high-entropy contents are candidate encryption keys. This ob-275
servation assists in improving memory analysis performance.276
Decrypt analysis. Candidate keys and IVs identified in277
memory analysis are used in decrypting network packets until278
a valid key and IV combination has been found. Decrypt vali-279
dation uses information derived from specific encrypted fields.280
SSH encrypted data blocks are of the following format:281
Packet Length (4 bytes) Padding Length (1 byte) Payload282
(variable bytes) Padding (variable bytes) MAC283
The packet length is the sum of the padding length size, the284
payload, and padding fields. So, equation (2) is a good decrypt285
test for many SSH messages as 2(8∗4−21) valid packet length de-286
crypts are possible. The minimum SSH block size is 21 bytes287
comprising a packet length of 4 bytes, a padding length of 1288
byte, and the payload and padding which is at least one block.289
So, the probability of an incorrect decrypt producing the correct290
header data is 1-in-4,294,967,275. Reassembly is undertaken291
when the SSH packet size exceeds the network packet size.292
Equation (2) is sound during the authentication, channel, and293
sub-service setup stages when SSH packet sizes are generally294
small and a modified version is used for reassembled SSH pack-295
ets. An additional test evaluates whether the decrypted padding296
length meets Equation (3) as required by SSH-TRANS. Correct297
decrypts are parsed to obtain SSH and SFTP fields.298
packet data length =
decrypted packet length +
size(packet length f ield) +
size(MAC f ield)
(2)
4 <= padding length <= 255 (3)
4. MemDecrypt Implementation299
This paper focuses on SSH decryption using AES-CTR and300
AES-CBC in virtualized environments using MemDecrypt. The301
following paragraphs present implementation and evaluation302
details. The framework is implemented on the Xen hypervi-303
sor [45]. Xen’s small trusted computing base makes it poten-304
tially less prone to vulnerabilities than hypervisors with larger305
footprints. Furthermore, the LibVMI library (“LibVMI,” n.d.)306
for Xen enables efficient memory access to live memory of307
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Windows or Linux virtual machines. As the Xen hypervisor308
has minimal functionality a privileged virtual machine (Dom0)309
manages the hypervisor and provides network and virtual disk310
device access to other virtual machines. Network access for311
the virtual machines is through a Dom0 virtual software bridge.312
The MemDecrypt components either all run on, or are initiated,313
from Dom0.314
The MemDecrypt implementation architecture for virtualized315
environments is illustrated in Figure 3. An isolated hypervisor316
supports two unprivileged virtual machines, shown in the cen-317
tre and right of the figure, and one privileged virtual machine318
shown on the left. Test client applications execute on the virtual319
machine on the right, targeting server applications executing on320
the virtual machine, shown in the centre.321
4.1. Data Collection322
For virtualized environments, virtual machine network traffic323
is inspected by redirecting each packet to a local queue using324
an iptables rule and NetFilterQueue 0.8.1 [46], and analyzing325
protocol fields using Scapy 2.3 [47]. When unusual activity is326
detected, the component stores the network packet and decon-327
structs the message. Memory is extracted for any 2 outgoing328
SSH messages after a New Keys message. Linux memory ex-329
traction uses PyVMI and LibVMI libraries, whereas Windows330
extraction applies Volatility framework user plugins.331
MemDecrypt obtains useful data from the SSH initialization332
stage. Client and server versions, and application if available333
are obtained from the protocol version exchange. The encryp-334
tion algorithm is determined from the “Key Exchange” mes-335
sages. Also, if initialization has completed, i.e. the “New Keys”336
has been transmitted, user-level read/write program memory337
extraction is triggered for two outgoing packets in the network338
session. Memory extracts are not required for consecutive pack-339
ets or to be immediately after the “New Keys” message.340
4.2. Memory Analysis341
Analysis approaches vary according to encryption mode and342
operating system. For AES-CTR, two steps are required to dis-343
cover candidate IVs and keys in memory, whereas AES-CBC344
requires only key discovery. For Windows, discovery is per-345
formed by iteratively analyzing multiple memory files extracted346
at different times, whereas, for Linux, a single heap file is ana-347
lyzed.348
For AES-CTR, candidate IVs are discovered first. As IVs349
increase but are likely to be located at the same memory address350
over different extracts, memory blocks that change is subject351
to further analysis. If the 16-byte value at a memory address352
increments by the number of encrypted blocks in the previous353
packet, then the address contents are a candidate IV. Supposing354
that value at location p in capture y at the time a is compared355
with the value at location p in capture y at time b. Then, if the356
values are IVs and represented by IVpya and IVpyb respectively,357
then IVpyb = IVpya +n, where n is the number of AES encrypted358
network blocks that have been sent between the time a and b in359
that session. For example, if the value of a 16-byte memory360
block is 123456 and two network packets with, say, 10 and 5361
encrypted blocks are sent and captured, then a value of 123471362
at the same position in the later extract identifies a candidate363
AES-CTR IV. Algorithm 1 shows the process.364
Data: extract folders f ldra, f ldrb and packets pkta, pktb
Result: Z = candidate IVs
delta := blocks[pkta:pktb];
for file f1 in f ldra do
f2 = match ( f1, f ldrb);
if f1 <> f2 then
for i = 0 to size( f1) inc 4 do
if val( f2[i:i+16]) - val( f1[i:i+16]) = delta then
Z += f1[i:i+16];
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: AES-CTR IV Memory Analysis
To discover AES candidate keys for AES-CTR and AES-365
CBC, the memory extract files are analysed. Key segment en-366
tropies are calculated for key length segment sizes. If an en-367
tropy exceeds a threshold, the segment is compared with the368
equivalent segment in a later extract, and if the segments are369
identical, the segment is a candidate encryption key. For exam-370
ple, a 256-bit key length, a 32-byte memory segment entropy371
of 4.9, and a 32-byte AES threshold of 4.65 determines the seg-372
ment to be of interest. An identical match to the segment at373
the same location in a later memory extract identifies a candi-374
date key. The identified candidate IVs and keys provide input375
to the decrypt analysis stage. Heuristic testing determined that376
AES entropy thresholds of 4.65 for 256-bit keys, 4.0 for 192-bit377
keys, and 3.4 for 128-bit keys ensured the inclusion of all keys378
in candidate sets while minimizing set size.379
4.3. Decrypt Analysis380
The component iterates through each candidate key for each381
candidate IV until decrypts are validated. The first ciphertext382
block is decrypted for each combination with pycrypto 2.6.1383
[48]. For a correct decrypt the first four plaintext bytes are384
the packet length and Equation (2) holds. For additional val-385
idation, the decrypted padding length is checked with Equation386
(3). With a valid key and IVs, MemDecrypt decrypts each block387
and deconstructs the SSH plaintext stream. For SSH authoriza-388
tion requests, the ’password’ type plaintext yields the remote389
user credentials and for SSH connection requests, the channel390
type, and channel request decrypts. For SFTP, all plaintext is391
produced including initialization, file attribute, file open, write392
and close message types fields. All plaintext is written to file393
for evaluation.394
4.4. Testbed395
The physical environment is a Core 2 Duo Dell personal396
computer with 40 GB of disk storage and 3 GB of RAM. It hosts397
the hypervisor, a Dom0 privileged virtual machine, an untrusted398
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Figure 3: MemDecrypt Virtualization Architecture
Windows virtual machine, and an untrusted Ubuntu virtual ma-399
chine. The hypervisor is Xen Project 4.4.1 and the Dom0 hy-400
pervisor console is Debian release 3.16.0-4-amd64 version 1.401
Tests run on Windows client and Linux server virtual ma-402
chines. One client runs a standard Windows 7 SP1 operating403
system with 512 MB of allocated memory and 30 GB of disk404
space. Another client runs a Windows 10 (10.0.16299) oper-405
ating system with 2 GB of memory and 40 GB of disk. Win-406
dows operating systems support a number of SSH clients [49].407
The selected PuTTY suite [23] is widely used [49] so may be408
used by suspect actors. However, other SSH client applica-409
tions should produce similar results. The untrusted Linux server410
virtual machine runs an Ubuntu 14.04 build (“Trusty”) with411
512 MB of allocated memory and 4 GB of disk storage. SSH412
server functionality is provided by openssh-server. To remove413
unnecessary communications with external agents, the dnsmasq414
package is installed and configured to respond to DNS requests415
with the server virtual machine IP address.416
5. Evaluation417
MemDecrypt is evaluated by running a sequence of experi-418
ments. The experimental set-up is described followed by the419
presentation and review of results. Possible countermeasures to420
MemDecrypt results are discussed.421
5.1. Experimental Set-up422
Experiments are performed with variable file sizes, key423
lengths, modes of operation, operating systems, and operating424
system versions. In each instance, the ’pscp’ program is425
executed from the Windows command line using requests of426
the form:427
428
pscp -P nnnn filename name@ipaddress:/home/name429
430
where nnnn is the target port, filename is the file being431
transmitted, name is a user account on the target Ubuntu server,432
ipaddress is the target server IP address and /home/name is the433
Ubuntu server target folder for the transmitted file. An Ubuntu434
service is started from the bash command line to listen to client435
SSH messages with requests of the form:436
437
/usr/sbin/sshd -f /root/sshd_config -d -p nnnn438
439
where nnnn is the service receiving port number and440
sshd_config contains configuration details such as encryption441
algorithms supported by the server.442
Sets of experiments investigate decrypting SSH traffic en-443
crypted with AES under different conditions. One set evaluates444
decrypt effectiveness for Windows 7 and Windows 10 clients.445
A second set evaluates the effectiveness of 128-bit, 192-bit and446
256-bit keys on Windows 10 clients in AES-CTR mode. A third447
set evaluates MemDecrypt effectiveness with 256-bit keys in448
AES-CBC and AES-CTR modes on Windows 10 clients. To449
evaluate file invariability, a fourth set uploads 30 files in text,450
pdf, Excel, and executable formats between 1 KB and 500 KB451
for Windows clients in AES-CTR mode using 256-bit keys. Ex-452
periments also assess decrypt effectiveness with Ubuntu server453
for AES-CBC and AES-CTR with 256-bit keys.454
5.2. Test Results455
In each experiment, encryption keys, and for AES-CTR456
initialization vectors, were discovered and valid plaintext457
produced for all SSH and SFTP fields. For example,458
with a client command of ’pscp -P 2222 plaintext.txt pe-459
ter@192.168.137.85:/home/peter’ and plaintext.txt of ’An out-460
cropping of limestone beside the path that had a silhouette. . . ’461
, the interesting decrypted fields are depicted in Figure 4.462
MemDecrypt also produces other SSH fields such as request463
identifiers, and file offsets. As observed earlier, the probability464
of an incorrect combination generating a packet length meeting465
Equation (2) is 0.00000002% (1 in 4,294,967,275). MemDe-466
crypt decrypts SSH traffic with a high degree of certainty.467
Analysis durations for producing correct plaintext deter-468
mines MemDecrypt’s usefulness. For example, if plaintext is469
produced during the network session MemDecrypt can assist in470
the prevention of further malicious activity, perhaps by drop-471
ping packets or hijacking the session.472
The first experiment compares the relative performance of473
Windows 7 and Windows 10 client virtual machines. For474
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Figure 4: SSH Decrypt Output
AES-CTR, two memory extracts are required for the analysis475
whereas, for CBC, one extract suffices. Memory analysis typ-476
ically executes for approximately nine seconds for Windows 7477
clients and 16 seconds for Windows 10 clients with a maximum478
of 25.1 seconds. Decrypt analysis durations varied between479
0.2 and 34.1 seconds averaging at 4.5 seconds. The variance480
is linked to the candidate IV set size and the ordinality of the481
correct IV within the file set.482
The second experiment compares analysis time durations for483
different CTR key sizes on Windows 10 clients. Shorter key484
lengths require lower entropy thresholds, so more candidate en-485
cryption keys are discovered in-memory analysis. Figure 5 il-486
lustrates a typical distribution of 32-byte entropy segments in487
read/write memory. This maps the count of memory segments488
exceeding an entropy with an entropy levels so that for exam-489
ple whereas out of 264,813 segments exceeding 0.0 entropy,490
188,602 (i.e. 72.1%) exceed 2.0, 2,628 (i.e. 0.99%) exceed 4.5.491
So, for example, in one test sequence memory analysis yielded492
candidate key set sizes of 272 for 256-bit key lengths, 1123 for493
192-bit key lengths, and 5658 for 128-bit key lengths. With494
these set sizes, decrypt analysis durations are longer for shorter495
key lengths as illustrated in Figure 6.496
The third experiment compares analysis time durations on497
Windows 10 clients for 256-bit key sizes in AES-CTR and498
AES-CBC. The CBC memory analysis takes approximately 16499
seconds which is similar to CTR. However, the CBC decrypt500
analysis duration is faster with a minimum of 0.07 seconds as501
iterating through potential IVs is not required.502
For experiments accessing Ubuntu server memory with the503
default encryption algorithm, i.e. AES with 256-bit key length504
and CTR mode, all client and server packets are correctly de-505
crypted. The data collection component obtains process lists506
and extracts process heap from the Ubuntu virtual machine in507
0.3 seconds. Memory analysis finds approximately 320 keys508
and 3 initialization vectors in 6 seconds, and decrypt analysis509
decrypts the session successfully in 37 seconds.510
MemDecrypt performance may suffice when extracts are ob-511
tained for Windows clients or Ubuntu servers. Nevertheless,512
strategies to enhance performance include improving memory513
extraction for Windows clients, pre-testing with known SSH514
client and server applications, pipelining, multi-threading, and515
implementing in a low-level language instead of Python. A516
custom extract engine using PyVMI and LibVMI libraries to517
replace Volatility plugins improves Windows memory extrac-518
tion performance. Pre-testing SSH client and server applica-519
tions may determine the distance between key and IV memory520
locations. Cryptographic libraries generally request memory521
to hold crypto data structures (’malloc’) when algorithms are522
agreed which occurs after the handshake so data is usually on523
the heap. The data structures can include fields such as en-524
cryption/decryption flag, key size, keys etc so for an algorithm,525
AES-CTR with 256 bit keys, the data structures may be invari-526
ant. For example, with PuTTY ’pscp’, distances are 968 bytes527
for 256-bit and 192-bit keys and 728 bytes for 128-bit-keys and528
are invariant with operating system version or transmitted file529
size. Where the distance is known, and the program identified530
from the SSH version message, memory analysis and decrypt531
analysis components take one second. Multi-threading sup-532
ports simultaneous analysis of multiple files and decrypts while533
pipelining between components enables analysis to terminate534
when the correct plaintext is obtained.535
So, MemDecrypt decrypts SSH sessions with high probabil-536
ity independent of file size, operating system type or version,537
key length, or mode. Furthermore, with SSH application pre-538
testing, analysis and decrypt decryption completes in 1 second.539
With unknown SSH applications, the plaintext is produced in540
under 60 seconds for 192-bit and 256-bit keys. Although in ex-541
periments, MemDecrypt decrypts sessions with exfiltrated files542
of 100 bytes, the risk exists that extracts are not acquired in543
terse SSH sessions. The risk might be mitigated by pausing the544
virtual machine. Decrypting sessions with SSH key rotation545
[50] is not currently implemented but the planned MemDecrypt546
approach is considering each rotation as a separate session with547
its own candidate keys and IVs.548
5.3. Countermeasures549
Countermeasures may prevent or delay MemDecrypt discov-550
ery of cryptographic artefacts. Invalid assumptions can invali-551
date the methodology. Candidate encryption keys are assumed552
to be high entropy, static for a network session, and in the same553
memory location. For entropy, less randomness, i.e. lower en-554
tropy, makes key regions less evident but key unpredictability555
is an essential requirement. For key staticity, MemDecrypt re-556
quires two extractions for AES-CTR, key changes would be re-557
quired between each outgoing packet which could cause ex-558
cessive transmission delays. Key location changes could delay559
decryption. However, tests on a Linux heap extract produced560
delays of less than 0.5 seconds. MemDecrypt assumes candi-561
date AES-CTR IVs are located at the same memory locations562
in each extract and values to increment by the sum of payload563
blocks in the previous packets. As with keys, tests where IV564
memory addresses changed induced delay of 0.5 seconds. As565
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a result, the measure may not suffice. AES-CTR IVs incre-566
ments make them detectable when stored in the clear in mem-567
ory. Another delaying measure is encrypting artefacts with an568
additional key. However, this key may be discoverable, and569
furthermore, the additional encryption and decryption for each570
packet, or block, may have an unacceptable performance im-571
pact. Obfuscation the artefacts may be more effective. For572
example, splitting key and IV strings and interpolating vari-573
able data between splits will limit MemDecrypt performance,574
and possibly effectiveness. This technique is faster and less de-575
tectable than an additional encryption layer. .A more effective576
counter-measure is preventing memory access to artefacts. For577
example, Intel [51] and AMD [52] may develop virtual ma-578
chine encryption where encryption keys are absent from virtual579
machine memory. Although this can offer privacy, malicious580
behaviour is then hidden so administrators may seek to disable581
the feature.582
6. Conclusions and Future Work583
The MemDecrypt framework rapidly discovers crypto-584
graphic artefacts and decrypts SSH communications in virtual-585
ized environments. This can assist in detecting, and preventing586
insider attackers from extracting and encrypting confidential in-587
formation to external locations. MemDecrypt can be extended588
to technologies where memory acquisition of live secure ses-589
sions is enabled. Decrypting SSH sessions may be illegal with-590
out approval so cryptographic artefact sets could be retained591
with the associated network traffic for decryption once approval592
is obtained. High performance makes the framework applicable593
so future work should apply multithreading and pipelining tech-594
niques before being extended to other non-virtualized use cases,595
secure protocols, encryption algorithms, and malware that use596
encrypted communications channels.597
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